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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-OBSCENITY: Supreme Court Looks to Local
Standards in Determining Obscenity
In one of a series of obscenity cases decided on June 21, 1973,'
the Supreme Court promulgated new standards for the delineation
of those sexually explicit materials which are not deemed within the
purview of first amendment guarantees. Facing the task of defining
that which may well be indefinable,' the Court formulated parame-
ters of first amendment protection for sexually oriented expression.
For the first time since its initial explication of obscenity standards
in Roth v. United States,3 a majority of the Court was able to agree
on a test for the determination of what "constitutes obscene, porno-
graphic materials subject to regulation under the state's police
power."4 The Court articulated these new standards for the identifi-
cation of obscene materials in Miller v. California.5 In this five to
four decision, the Court established standards "more concrete than
those in the past"' and effectively returned the enforcement of por-
nography laws to the discretion of state and local governments.'
THE INTRACTABLE OBSCENITY PROBLEM
Since the initial holding in the Roth case that obscene material
is not worthy of first amendment protections,8 the Court has been
plagued by a divergence of individual viewpoints resulting in an
inability to formulate stable and manageable standards for the divi-
sion of sexually explicit expression into protected and nonprotected
categories. As Mr. Justice Harlan observed:
The upshot of all this divergence in viewpoint is that any-
one who undertakes to examine the court's decisions since
Roth which have held particular material obscene or not
obscene would find himself in utter bewilderment.9
1. The Supreme Court decided five obscenity cases on June 21, 1973. Miller v. Califor-
nia, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628 (1973); United States
v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8 mm Film, 93 S. Ct. 2665 (1973); United States v. Orito, 93 S.
Ct. 2674 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2680 (1973).
2. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
3. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
4. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2614 (1973).
5. 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973).
6. Id. at 2612.
7. See notes 67-72 infra and accompanying text.
8. 354 U.S. at 485.
9. Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 707 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
et al.: Constiutional Law—Obscenity: Supreme Court Looks to Local Standar
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1973
OBSCENITY
The Roth decision initiated an obscenity test which attempted
to identify obscene material by inquiring:
whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interests.'"
In the aftermath of the Roth determinations, the Court struggled to
devise a viable approach to the obscenity problem. Grappling with
what has been called the "intractable obscenity problem,"" the
individual Justices went their separate ways on standards for imple-
mentation of the Roth criteria and, indeed, as to its very propriety.
Misters Justice Black and Douglas steadfastly adhered to the
premise that government is without power to regulate or control the
citizenry's freedom of expression on the basis of any obscenity test.'2
Both Justices would preclude the federal government from placing
any type of burden on the first amendment guarantees of speech and
expression."
The most frequently adhered to test for the identification of
obscenity was adopted by Mr. Chief Justice Warren, Mr. Justice
Fortas and Mr. Justice Brennan, in A Book Named "John Cleland's
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts.'4 This plural-
ity opinion announced that under the Roth definition three ele-
ments must coalesce:
a) The dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to prurient interest in sex;
b) The material is patently offensive because it af-
fronts contemporary community standards relating to the
description or representation of sexual matters; and
c) The material is utterly without redeeming social
value.' 5
Even the Justices who articulated the Memoirs adaptation of the
10. 354 U.S. at 489.
11. Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, supra at 704 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
12. See, e.g., Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 467, 482 (1966) (dissenting
opinions); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (concurring opinion).
13. E.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2663 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508 (1957) (Douglas and Black, JJ., dissent-
ing).
14. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
15. Id. at 418.
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Roth test failed to agree on the parameters of the Memoirs criteria.
The three element test formulated by the Memoirs plurality pro-
duced disagreement on the nature and extent of "contemporary
community standards,"' 6 and failed to provide viable criteria for the
identification of unprotected sexual expression in all situations. 7
Distinguishing the nature of the power possessed by federal as
opposed to state authorities, Mr. Justice Harlan propounded differ-
ing obscenity standards for each level of government.18 Mr. Justice
Harlan found federal authority to regulate sexually oriented expres-
sion to be "incidental to its other powers."'" As such, federal restric-
tions on first amendment guarantees were seen to be constitution-
ally limited to the regulation of "hard-core" pornography. 0 Juxta-
posed with this restricted role of the federal government were the
state and local authorities who "bear direct responsibility for the
protection of the local moral fabric."'" Mr. Justice Harlan would
allow the states a degree of latitude not available to the federal
government. The states would not be prohibited from:
banning any material which, taken as a whole, has been
reasonably found in state judicial proceedings to treat with
sex in a fundamentally offensive manner, under rationally
established criteria for judging such material.12
Declaring that he had "stomached past cases for almost ten
years without much outcry, 2 3 Mr. Justice Clark expounded the
view that "evidence of social importance is relevant to the determi-
nation of the ultimate question of obscenity. '" 24 This social import-
ance test was not considered to be a separate and distinct constitu-
tional test. Any evidence of such social importance was to be -consid-
ered "together with evidence that the material in question appeals
16. Compare Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (Brennan, J., joined by Gold-
berg, J.) with id. at 200 (Warren, C.J., joined by Clark, J., dissenting).
17. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (obscenity for juveniles);
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) (prurient appeal defined in terms of a deviant
sexual group).
18. See A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 215 (1964) (dissenting opinion
joined by Clark, J.)
19. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 496 (1957) (separate opinion).
20. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 493 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
21. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 496 (1957) (separate opinion).
22. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 204 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
23. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 441 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
24. Id.
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to prurient interest and is patently offensive." 5
Mr. Justice Stewart contended that both federal and state
authorities are constitutionally limited to the regulation of "hard-
core" pornography. 6 In response to Chief Justice Warren's query:
"who can define hard-core pornography with any greater clarity
than obscenity?"" Mr. Justice Stewart remarked that perhaps he
might never succeed in intelligibly defining hard-core pornography
but that he "know[s] it when [he] sees it. ' ''
In the view of Mr. Justice White, the sQcial importance criteria
was not an independent test for obscenity "but is relevant only to
determining the predominant prurient interest of the material. ' 29
Mr. Justice White would find a publication obscene if the predomi-
nant theme of the material appeals to prurient interests "in a man-
ner exceeding customary limits of candor." 30
Amidst such a divergency of views, the Court began in Redrup
v. New York3' a policy whereby convictions for the dissemination of
sexually oriented materials were summarily reversed when at least
five members of the Court, applying their separate tests, found the
materials to be within the class of protected expression under the
first amendment. The Court's utilization of per curiam reversals
and denials of certiorari as the means of dealing with obscenity
cases obscured the rationale of these decisions.32 These techniques
also gave an air of arbitrariness to the Court's obscenity rulings. 3
This Redrup policy of per curiam reversals and denials of certiorari
was employed by the Court for six years and was determinative in
the disposition of thirty-one obscenity cases .34 At no time during this
period did the Court offer any justification for such a policy "beyond
the necessity of circumstances." In the absence of a consensus as
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 497 (1966) (dissenting opinion);
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (concurring opinion).
27. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
28. Id. (concurring opinion).
29. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 462 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
30. Id. at 460-61.
31. 396 U.S. 767 (1967).
32. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2647 (1973) (Brennan, J., joined by
Stewart, J. & Marshall, J., dissenting).
33. Id.
34. A listing of the cases handled by the Court in this fashion can be found at id. n.8.
35. See Walker v. Ohio, 398 U.S. 463 (1970).
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to the bounds of legitimate utilization of sexual exposition as a
vehicle of expression, the Court had become an "unreviewable
board of censorship for the fifty states, subjectively judging each
piece of material. 3 The Miller obscenity standards terminate the
Court's practice of summary reversals and bring a degree of stability
to an area which has proved most resistant to the structuring of
stable and manageable criterion.
The ability of the Court to formulate a majority view on the
obscenity issue can be attributed to the recently increased rate of
attrition among the Justices and the resulting Presidential appoint-
ments to the Court. Chief Justice Warren Burger articulated the
majority opinion. Joining the Chief Justice were the other three
members of the Court nominated by President Nixon and Mr. Jus-
tice White. 37 Filing a separate dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas sug-
gested that there are no constitutional guidelines for defining a class
of sexually oriented expression that may be suppressed by govern-
ment. Mr. Justice Douglas proposed a constitutional amendment as
a means of achieving the ends sought by the majority.3 Mr. Justice
Brennan was joined in a dissent by Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr.
Justice Marshall. These three Justices reluctantly concluded that
none of the available formulas provide for a sufficient degree of
specificity and clarity to "prevent substantial erosion of protected
speech as a by-product of the attempt to suppress unprotected
speech."39 Mr. Justice Brennan proposed the dropping of all prohibi-
tions on sexually explicit expression except those designed to pro-
tect juveniles and adults who choose to avoid exposure to such ma-
terials. 0
THE MILLER STANDARD
The Appellant in the Miller case was appealing from a convic-
tion pursuant to California Penal Code §311.2 (a) for knowingly
distributing obscene material.41 The Appellant had caused the unso-
36. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2614 n.3 (1973).
37. Id. at 2610.
38. Id. at 2627.
39. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2657 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
40. Id. at 2642.
41. CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.2 (a) (West 1970) provided at the time of the alleged commis-
sion of the offense that:
Every person who knowingly: sends or causes to be sent, or brings or causes to be
brought, into this state for sale or distribution, or in this state prepares, publishes,
[Vol. 8
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licited mailing of five advertising brochures containing descriptive
printed material accompanied by pictures and drawings "depicting
men and women in groups of two or more engaging in a variety of
sexual activities, with genitals often prominently displayed."42 Cali-
fornia Penal Code §311 was structured to incorporate the three stage
obscenity test enumerated by Mr. Justice Brennan in the plurality
opinion of the Memoirs case.43 In initiating the formulation of a new
standard for the identification of obscene expression, the Miller
Court rejected the Memoirs criteria as being unworkable and as
having been abandoned even by its author 44
The Miller decision affirmed the Roth determination that there
exists an unprotected class of sexually explicit expression which is
not worthy of first amendment protection.45 The majority found it
demeaning to equate the "free and robust exchange of ideas and po-
litical debate with the commercial exploitation of obscene materi-
als."4 Any failure to distinguish between intercourse in ideas and
exploitation of sex is a "misuse of the great guarantees of free speech
and free press. . ... ,4 and would sanction indifference to the
"grand conception of the First Amendment and its high purposes
in the historic struggle for freedom." 8 The Miller majority specifi-
cally rejected the "utterly without redeeming social value"49 test as
a constitutional standard for the identification of obscene materi-
als." The Court also dismissed the "social importance"'" concept as
prints, exhibits, distributes, or offers to distribute, or has in his possession with intent
to distribute or exhibit or offer to distribute, any obscene matter is guilty of a misde-
meanor.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 311 (West 1970) provided:
As used in this chapter:
(a) 'obscene' means that to the average person, applying contemporary standards,
the predominant appeal of the matter, taken as a whole, is to prurient interest, i.e.,
a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, which goes substantially
beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters
and is matter which is utterly without redeeming social importance.
42. Miller v. California, 9 S. Ct. 2607, 2611 (1973).
43. See note 41 infra.
44. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2614 (1973).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2620.
47. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 645 (1951).
48. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2620 (1973).
49. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
50. 93 S. Ct. at 2615.
51. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
1973]
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being too unworkable and ambiguous to qualify as a constitutional
criteria."5
Realizing the "inherent dangers in undertaking to regulate any
form of expression, 53 the Miller Court restricted governmental reg-
ulation of sexual expression to those materials which depict or de-
scribe physical sexual contact or explicit sexual acts.54 Once it has
been established that the materials in question are vulnerable to
governmental regulation, the inquiry turns to a determination of
whether the materials are to be classified as protected or unpro-
tected (obscene) expression. The definition of obscenity espoused by
the Miller Court finds sexually explicit materials to be unworthy of
first amendment protections when, taken as a whole, they appeal
to prurient interests in sex and lack any serious literary, artistic, or
scientific value while portraying sexual conduct in a patently offen-
sive manner." With the purpose of providing basic guidelines for
implementation of this new obscenity criteria, the Miller majority
propounded three inquiries intended to provide-the trier of fact with
the requisite tools to separate obscenity from other sexually explicit
but constitutionally protected expression.
Initially, a query must be made as to "whether the average
person, applying contemporary community standards would find
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interests." 56 With
this initial directive to the jury, the Court was affirming a concern
originally expressed in Mishkin v. New York . 7 To the extent that
the material is not directed towards a definable deviate group, the
impact thereof is to be judged on the basis of an average person with
normal sensitivities and susceptibilities. Seemingly the most far-
reaching aspect of this first element of the new obscenity definition
is the Court's finding that the utilization of the prevailing standards
of the forum community satisfies all constitutional requisites. The
use of a national community standard as proposed in Jacobellis v.
Ohio58 by Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Goldberg was re-
jected by the Miller majority as constitutionally unnecessary and
52. 93 S. Ct. at 2615.
53. 93 S. Ct. at 2614.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 93 S. Ct. at 2615.
57. 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
58. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
[Vol. 8
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fundamentally unsound." Concluding that a national community
standard would produce an absolutism of imposed uniformity, the
Court found it:
neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First
Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mis-
sissippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable
in Las Vegas, or New York. 0
The Miller Court could find nothing in the first amendment which
mandates "hypothetical and unascertainable"' national standards
for obscenity determinations. A jury ruling that a particular piece
of material appeals to prurient interests in sex is a finding of fact
and our nation is simply
too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect
that such standards could be articulated for all fifty states
in a single formulation, even assuming the pre-requisite
consensus exists.6
2
It is merely an acceptable consequence of the jury system that juries
may reach differing results as to the obscene nature of materials.
The fact that juries can differ as to factual determinations of
whether the material appeals to prurient interests does not conclu-
sively indicate that constitutional rights have been abridged.63 To
require local juries to make judgments on the basis of some abstract
formulations of a national standard is to place a severe burden on
state prosecution of obscenity cases. 4
On the same day that the Miller case was decided, the Court
ruled in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton5 that the jury was in the
best position to make the factual determinations as to what consti-
tutes the forum communities' local standards. 6 As such, it is not
error for the prosecution to fail to present any expert affirmative
testimony that the materials are obscene.67 The contested materials
59. 93 S. Ct. at 2618.
60. Id. at 2619.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2618.
63. Id. at 2616 n.9; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492 n.30 (1957).
64. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2613 (1973).
65. 93 S. Ct. 2628 (1973).
66. Id. at 2634.
67. Id.
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need only be presented to the jury for the application of local com-
munity standards as conceived of by the individual jurors.68 The
Slaton decision does reserve judgment, however, on the extreme
case where the contested materials are directed at "such a bizarre
deviant group"69 that the experience of the trier of fact would not
render it qualified to judge the prurient nature of the materials.
The second guideline established for the trier of fact is an in-
quiry as to whether the contested materials "depict or describe, in
a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law."70 Specificity was the Court's primary concern
under this second criterion. In placing the central responsibility for
the regulation of obscene matter with state and local authorities, the
Miller Court instructed the states to formulate regulatory schemes
which graphically delineate that which is to be suppressed.7'
Rejecting the role of statute drafter, the Miller Court encour-
aged renewed legislative efforts aimed at the promulgation of ob-
scenity statutes which meet these new specificity requirements."
However, by way of example, the Court did present two definition-
al standards which meet the new criteria. Statutory language such
as:
a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of
ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simu-
lated.
b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of
masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibitions of
the genitals.7 3
would satisfy this specificity criteria. If a statute is written or con-
strued to meet this level of accuracy, the first amendment protec-
tions applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment
are "adequately protected by the ultimate power of appellate courts
to conduct an independent review of constitutional claims when
necessary." 4 The Miller majority cited the obscenity statutes of
68. Id.
69. Id. n.6.
70. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2615 (1973).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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Oregon and Hawaii as examples of legislation which complies with
the specificity requisites enumerated in this second guideline."5
The third element of the Miller obscenity standard replaces the
"utterly without redeeming social value" test suggested by the
Memoirs plurality. The third inquiry is whether the material taken
as a whole has "serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value.""6 Central to the Court's third criterion is the distinction
between commerce in ideas and the commercial exploitation of sex-
ual materials for commercial gain. The Miller majority found that
the first amendment protects only those sexually oriented materials
which have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. Any
other determination, said the Court, would make a mockery of that
which the first amendment was meant to protect." The Court found
that such a criterion precludes a jury determination of obscenity for
medical and other educational tests, 8 while easing the virtually
insurmountable burden faced by the prosecution under the redeem-
ing social value test. 9
A LOOK AT THE NEW STANDARD
The determination by the Miller majority that patently offen-
sive depictions or descriptions of prurient sexual conduct must pos-
sess serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value to warrant
first amendment protection will predictively do little to dispel the
Court's critics. Indeed, the four dissenting Justices will provide the
Court's detractors with much ammunition on the obscenity issue.
Even this "earnest and well-intentioned"'" effort by the five
member majority to bring a semblance of stability to a most unset-
tled area is wrought with difficulties. The vexing problem central
to any obscenity determination is the creation of a constitutional
definition for a concept which is never mentioned or even alluded
to in the Constitution or Bill of Rights.' Anything less than a com-
plete abandonment of efforts at regulation of commercial exploita-
75. Id. n.6; see, e.g., OREGON LAWS 1971, c. 743, art. 29 §§ 255-262, and HAWAII PENAL
CODE, tit. 37, §§ 1210-1216, 1972 Hawaii Session Laws, pp. 126-129, art. 9, Pt. I.
76. 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2615 (1973).
77. Id. at 2620.
78. Id. at 2616.
79. Id. at 2613.
80. Id. at 2623 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
81. Id.
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tion of sexual materials will not quiet some of the Court's critics . 2
But if it is assumed that obscene material can be regulated by state
and local authorities in the exercise of their police powers, then the
problem becomes one of separating protected from nonprotected
expression. The argument is made that the task of dividing obscen-
ity from other forms of sexual but constitutionally protected expres-
sion is an exercise in futility." Problems of vagueness, fair notice
and the chilling effect on the exercise of first amendment rights are
seen as defeating any attempt at formulation of a constitutional line
of demarcation between protected expression and obscenity. 4 But
the Constitution does not require impossible standards:
all that is required is that the language conveys sufficiently
definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when mea-
sured by common understanding and practices.85
The fact that there may exist marginal cases which require tough
decisions as to which side of the line the materials belong is not
"sufficient reason to hold the language too ambiguous to define a
criminal offense."86
The prosecution's burden of proof under the Memoirs criteria
was difficult to sustain.87 The Memoirs test required the proving of
a negative by the prosecution. A successful prosecution required a
showing that the expression was "utterly without redeeming social
value." A successful defense to an obscenity charge pursuant to the
Memoirs rationale necessitated that the defendant simply show that
the contested material contained the smallest fabric of social value.
Although the Miller majority also espoused a test requiring the proof
of a negative, the task confronted by prosecutors in obscenity cases
should be substantially lessened. Under the third component of the
Miller test, the material must be shown to lack "serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value. 8 s8 Seemingly there can be a
finding of obscenity even where the materials clearly contain some
82. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2642 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
joined by Stewart, J. and Marshall, J., dissenting).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1946).
86. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2617 n.10 (1973).
87. For a discussion of the prosecution difficulties under the Memoirs test, see id. at
2613.
88. 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2615 (1973).
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social value provided that the prosecution is able to sustain the
burden of proving that the value of the materials, measured by the
standards of the forum community, are not sufficiently serious to
warrant first amendment protection. Whether this reduced burden
of proof will promote repression of expression by local crusading
prosecutors cannot be determined at this early date. But what is
assured is that the Court has effectively returned the responsibility
for the policing of sexually explicit materials to state and local au-
thorities.
With the implementation of the local forum community stan-
dard criteria, the Miller court has established a more manageable
and discernable guideline for jury determinations. While some mini-
mal danger to expression may still exist, the local standards carry
no greater risk of repression then do national standards. Sounding
the alarm of repression, opponents of local standards contend that
only with a national standard will the evils of self-imposed censor-
ship 9 and interference with the free flow of interstate commerce be
avoided." Local standards are seen as unacceptable in that the
disseminators of sexually explicit materials will simply not distrib-
ute in certain areas in lieu of risking criminal conviction for being
in violation of the communities' standard for obscenity. In actual-
ity, the utilization of a national standard necessarily implies that
sexual materials may not be available in certain localities because
the materials are violative of the national standard while the local-
ity's criteria may find the expression acceptable.9 The Miller major-
ity dismisses the alleged interference with the free flow of interstate
commerce by observing that:
Obscene material may be validly regulated by a state in the
exercise of its traditional local power to protect the general
89. Concern has been expressed over the effect which varying local standards will have
on publishers of national magazines and the film industry. ACLU staff counsel Joel Gora has
warned:
They can choose to stay out of certain states, and that is obnoxious from a First
Amendment standpoint. Or, what's more likely, publishers might exercise a form of
self-censorship and direct their films and books to the most conservative taste in their
major markets.
NEWSWEEK, July 2, 1973, at 21.
90. Petitioners in Miller v. California argued that adherence to a national standard was
necessary in order to avoid unconscionable burdens on the free flow of interstate commerce.
93 S. Ct. 2607, 2619 n.13 (1973).
91. See id.
1973]
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welfare of its population despite some possible incidental
effect on the flow of such materials across state lines.2
Although the Court demanded that state and local statutory
schemes clearly and succinctly delineate that which is prohibited,
the Court's own attempt at specificity suffers from lack of precision.
The phraseology "patently offensive" is seemingly as susceptible to
vagueness and overbreath attacks as the Roth-Memoirs delineation.
The only way that the Miller criteria can avoid these vulnerabilities
is for state and local authorities to promulgate painstakingly spe-
cific obscenity regulations. Predictively, local authorities may sim-
ply incorporate the Miller majority's illustrative statutory language
verbatim in the local regulatory scheme.13 The local statute drafters
must achieve that degree of specificity which will provide a person
with ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is forbidden. 4 If the
requisite level of specificity is achieved by the local statute drafters,
the only remaining uncertainties will revolve around the juries' con-
ceptualization and adaptation of the forum communities' criterion
for measuring the offensiveness of the contested materials. Such
uncertainty is equivalent to that risk borne by anyone charged with
criminal misconduct and is inherent in the jury system." To argue
that this uncertainty in obscenity cases is not compatible with con-
stitutional guarantees is to presume a preferred status for the dis-
seminator of sexually explicit matter in the criminal process."
While the alleged obscenity offender is certainly guaranteed the
same constitutional protections as anyone under prosecution for a
criminal act, there is no reason for preferential treatment. Anyone
charged with an obscenity violation is provided these same protec-
92. Id.; see, e.g., Head v. New Mexico Board, 374 U.S. 424 (1963); Breard v. Alexandria,
341 U.S. 622 (1951).
93. On October 26, 1973, the City Council of Valparaiso, Indiana enacted Ordinance
No. 48 which reads in relevant part:
110.01 Activity Prohibited. No person shall sell, lend, give away or offer to sell,
lend or give away or in any manner exhibit any patently offensive representations or
descriptions of masturbation, excretory funtions, lewd exhibition of the genitals, or
of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated, that taken as a
whole appeals to the prurient interest, unless such representations or descriptions,
taken as a whole, have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
94. For a discussion of the vagueness problem see Note, The Void-for- Vagueness Doc-
trine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
95. For a discussion of local community standards and the role of jury determinations
in obscenity cases see O'Meara and Shaffer, Obscenity in the Supreme Court: A Note on
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 40 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 1 (1964).
96. Id. at 10.
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tions when a jury, acting under proper instructions, makes its fac-
tual determinations. As with any criminal proceeding, the jury ver-
dict in an obscenity case is subject to judicial supervisory control
and review pursuant to the Miller criteria."
CONCLUSION
With the Miller decision, the Court has placed the burden of
dealing with a most perplexing problem squarely on the shoulders
of state and local authorities. Critics of the decision have expressed
concern over the ability of local communities to administer the
Miller standards while preserving fundamental first amendment
guarantees."5 Indeed, initial news media accounts indicate a growing
activitist attitude amongst local prosecution authorities.,' Whether
there is justification for those who sound the alarm of repression will
depend, in large measure, on the response of these officials to this
newly created responsibility. The Miller majority has brought a
semblance of stability and manageability to an area too long
plagued by uncertainty and indecision. The success of the Miller
standard in achieving that delicate balance between a society's le-
gitimate concern for the welfare of its citizenry and the right of the
individual within that society to express himself freely in accord-
ance with constitutional guarantees"" is now in the hands of those
local officials, judges and juries who are charged with implementa-
tion of the Miller standard.
97. Id. at 11.
98. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2642 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
joined by Stewart & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
99. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, July 2, 1973, at 18; U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, July 2,
1973, at 35; TIME, July 2, 1973, at 44.
100. See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C. J., dissenting).
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